









Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
Peter Nijkamp 
Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
Jacques Poot 




Most ‘wage curve’ studies treat local labour markets as independent ‘islands’ in the 
national economy. However, when a local labour market is in close proximity of other 
labour markets, a local shock that increases unemployment may not lead to lower pay 
rates if employers fear outward migration of their workers. Hence, the unemployment 
elasticity of pay will be greater, the more isolated the local labour market is. Wages 
are also expected to be higher in regions that interact strongly with other regions. 
These hypotheses are confirmed by means of an estimation of wage curves with data 




JEL classification: J21, J30, R23 
 
Key words: Unemployment, wage formation, spatial analysis, local monopsony, 
Germany 
 
                                                 
∗ Paper prepared for the 44
th Congress of European Regional Science Association, Porto, Portugal, 25-
29 August, 2004. Comments by Thomas de Graaff and Raymond Florax on a draft of this paper are 
gratefully acknowledged. Corresponding author: Jacques Poot. Postal address: Population Studies 





Spatial Heterogeneity and the Wage Curve Revisited 
 
Abstract 
Most ‘wage curve’ studies treat local labour markets as independent ‘islands’ in the national economy. 
However, when a local labour market is in close proximity of other labour markets, a local shock that 
increases unemployment may not lead to lower pay rates if employers fear outward migration of their 
workers. Hence, the unemployment elasticity of pay will be greater, the more isolated the local labour 
market is. Wages are also expected to be higher in regions that interact strongly with other regions. 
These hypotheses are confirmed by means of an estimation of wage curves with data for 327 regions of 
western Germany over the period 1990-97. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The efficient functioning of labour markets is a key concern of public policy. During 
the last two decades, many governments of developed economies have adopted 
dedicated policies that aim at enhancing labour market flexibility. The objective of 
such policies is not only to reduce levels of unemployment, but also to improve the 
countries’ competitive position in increasingly globalised markets. Labour market 
rigidity was perceived to be particularly severe in Western Europe and in Australasia, 
where governments aspired to the flexibility experienced by employers and workers 
in the US labour market. There was, however, by no means a unique set of policies 
adopted to enhance labour market flexibility, as each country had to take into account 
its own rather unique structural and institutional characteristics. Thus, a variety of 
‘models’ of reform emerged, such as the ‘rhineland model’ in Germany, the ‘kiwi 
model’ in New Zealand, the ‘polder model’ in The Netherlands and the ‘bulldog 
model’ in the United Kingdom (see e.g. Freeman, 1998; Gorter and Poot, 1999).  
Wherever labour market reform was implemented, it became apparent that 
there was not only a price to pay in terms of a growing personal income inequality, 
but also in terms of growing regional diversity (e.g. Karagedikli et al., 2000; Dohse et 
al., 2002). This necessitated the need for a fresh look at prevailing regional economic 
policies. 
A central question in this context is the extent to which local labour markets 
exhibit non-competitive features. If local labour markets are competitive, the growing 
inequality and regional divergence observed in recent years may be merely a 
transitional phenomenon. Factor mobility and interregional trade may in this case 
diminish personal and spatial differentials in the long run. If, on the other hand, local 
employers face upward sloping labour supply curves and if there is information  
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asymmetry in the labour market and/or externalities leading to spatial agglomeration, 
the greater spatial inequality following reform may be rather persistent. Specific 
policies may then be needed to overcome market failures. 
  The empirical evidence for non-competitive features of local labour markets is 
rather indirect and incomplete. An interesting example in this context is an empirical 
phenomenon referred to as the ‘wage curve’. Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) found, 
using American and British micro data, an inverse relationship between the level of 
pay of individuals and the local unemployment rate and labelled this relationship the 
wage curve. Their later research (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) and the research of 
other investigators, using similar data for other countries, provided further evidence 
for the existence of such a relationship.
1 Nijkamp and Poot (2002) confirmed by 
means of a meta-analysis of the international evidence that the wage curve is a robust 
phenomenon. There are several explanations possible for this relationship. Among 
these, efficiency wage or labour turnover cost explanations that feature individual 
employers facing upward sloping supply curves in local labour markets are 
considered the most plausible (see also Card, 1995, and the short review in next 
section of this paper). 
  The theory of monopsony has gained increasing attention in recent years (see 
Boal and Ransom, 1997, and Manning, 2003), but outright monopsony would be a 
rather extreme market form in that most firms face some competition in their 
recruitment while barriers to entry into specific markets have been reduced in recent 
years.
2 It is therefore more likely that firms engage in monopsonistic or oligopsonistic 
competition in which there is free entry, but the establishment of new firms is 
constrained by start up costs, firms face costs of recruitment and training, and workers 
face varying costs of job search, commuting or migration, dependent on their 
residential location and their own characteristics. In such labour markets, wages and 
unemployment are likely to be inversely related (Bhaskar and To, 1999) and this 
relationship may be reinforced by agglomeration effects (Sato, 2000). 
                                                 
1 For example, Blackaby and Hunt (1992), Winter-Ebmer (1996), Bratsberg and Turunen (1996), 
Janssens and Konings (1998), Baltagi and Blien (1998), Kennedy and Borland (2000), Papps (2001), 
Boushey (2002), Montuenga et al. (2003), and Ikkaracan and Selim (2003). 
 
2 “One-company towns” are the classic example of pure monopsony. In the modern economy, they are 
no longer common, except as a legacy of a communist past in transitional economies. Rama and Scott 
(1999) show that one-company towns in Kazakhstan face upward sloping labour supply curves. 
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Much of the existing wage curve literature considers local labour markets as 
independent ‘islands’ in the national economy. If the wage curve is the result of 
monopsonistic competition, we would expect that the extent to which employers face 
upward sloping labour supply curves will depend on the employment opportunities in 
surrounding regions and the interregional cost of commuting, or migration. The 
purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate spatial effects in wage curves. 
There is as yet little empirical evidence on this. Using German data, Buettner 
(1999a) tested whether the wage curve could be extended by including a spatial lag of 
wages on the right hand side of the earnings equation or by considering spatial error 
correlation in the model. He found strong support for the former hypothesis, but not 
for the latter. Morrison et al. (2003) found evidence of the effect of labour market 
isolation on the wage curve in the New Zealand context through introducing the 
weighted average of travel time by road to other local labour markets as an additional 
explanatory variable in the earnings equation. In this paper, we will reconsider spatial 
effects in the wage curve, using data for 327 regions of western Germany over the 
period 1990-97. We consider the wage curve as indicative of local monopsonistic 
competition in the labour market and test several, previously unexplored, hypotheses 
that can be derived from this point of view. 
The next section briefly reviews the theoretical explanations for the wage 
curve and the likely implications of spatial dependence. Section 3 reports on the 
estimation of a wage curve with data for 327 regions of western Germany over the 
1990-97 period. Section 3 also reviews some of the specification issues involved in 
estimating such a wage curve. Section 4 provides evidence on a range of spatial 
effects that are consistent with the notion that employers in local labour markets 
engage in monopsonistic competition. The final section sums up and suggests avenues 
for further research in this area. 
 
2.  Implications of monopsonistic local labour markets 
What determines wages at the local labour market level? There are likely to be many 
factors, the importance of which may vary across countries (see, e.g., Molho, 1992). 
We use for our empirical research a dataset that provides statistical information on the 
regions of the former West Germany (excluding West Berlin). Consequently, we will 
confine ourselves to factors relevant to those regions. Buettner (1999b) discusses 
regional wage formation in Germany in some detail.  
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  For the majority of industries in Germany, wages are negotiated at the industry 
level by bargaining between employer representatives and unions. These negotiations 
lead to a set of collective agreements that may only apply to union members, but in 
practice are often extended to non-union members. These collective agreements act as 
a floor for wage outcomes, as there are various sources of regional wage flexibility. 
Firstly, there may be regionally-specific collective contract wages, although the 
incidence of regional agreements is not that great (Buettner, 1999b). Of course, there 
may be also some flexibility built into the collective agreements that enable 
employers to vary wages somewhat across regions. Furthermore, flexibility is 
introduced if agreements are only weakly enforced. In any case, the collectively 
agreed wage levels are only binding when the competitive wage would be less than 
the union wage. If there is a shortage of labour, a wage gap may emerge in which 
firm-specific agreements lead to wages being paid that are higher than the national 
‘union’ wage. Bonus payments provide another form of flexibility. Besides a change 
in contracted wages, firms may also respond to a demand shock by varying hours 
worked and by recruitment and retention decisions. 
  Given the mixture of national and local bargaining influences on local pay 
rates, it is clear that there will be more upward flexibility in times of a tight local 
labour market than downward flexibility in times of a local recession. As Buettner 
(1999b) notes, when the unconstrained wage that employers would wish to pay is 
below the wage stipulated by a national collective agreement, the firm becomes 
constrained and will pay at least the ‘contract wage’. 
For reasons to be elaborated below, employers who have some control over 
wages would wish to lower these (or at least limit increases) when the local labour 
market is slack and unemployment high. Given a mixture of national and local wage 
setting influences, the responsiveness (elasticity) of wages to the local unemployment 
rate is likely to be less at high rates of unemployment. This hypothesis was previously 
empirically confirmed, for example, for the UK and US wage curves by Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1990) and by Buettner (1999b) for western Germany. The latter found 
that dy/du = -0.102/U, with y the natural logarithm of average earnings in a region, u 
the natural logarithm of the unemployment rate and U the percentage unemployment 
rate. This implies a relatively small unemployment elasticity of pay of between -0.04 
at German local unemployment rates of around 2.5 percent to an almost negligible 
elasticity of -0.005 at unemployment rates of around 18 percent.  
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In their 1994 book, Blanchflower and Oswald offer three possible 
explanations for an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and local 
wages. They are: (i) a labour contract model, (ii) an efficiency wage model, and (iii) a 
bargaining model. A summary and assessment of these alternative models is given by 
Card (1995). 
In the labour contract model, firms and workers agree on a state-contingent 
wage level and a state-contingent employment level along the lines of the standard 
Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974) implicit contracts model. Higher wages will 
coincide with a higher level of contractual employment. Differences in regional 
amenities then result in spatial differences in equilibrium wages and employment: 
regions with attractive amenities have relatively lower wages and higher 
unemployment rates, while regions with unattractive features offer relatively higher 
wages and lower unemployment rates. 
The labour contract model has been criticised by Card (1995) as being 
inconsistent with the ‘compensating differentials’ model in which wage and the 
unemployment rate are positively related in the long run. Papps (2001), using New 
Zealand data, shows that the wage curve is not inconsistent with the existence of a 
long-run spatial equilibrium in which expected wages are equalised across regions 
and therefore long-run unemployment and long-run wages are positively correlated 
(see also the classical arguments offered by, e.g., Harris and Todaro, 1970, and Hall, 
1972). Instead, the wage curve is likely to be a short-run response of earnings to 
business cycle variations in labour market tightness. 
A union bargaining model can provide a second theoretical explanation for the 
wage curve. In this model, going back to De Menil (1971), workers in a unionised 
production sector will extract a wage premium from employers that will be greater in 
a tighter labour market. Hence an inverse relationship between wages and 
unemployment rates results. However, for this model to be plausible at the local 
labour market, collective bargaining must take place at the local level. Buettner and 
Fitzenberger (2001) provide evidence that the wage curve is less elastic where wages 
are determined nationally or by industry and more elastic with enterprise-based (i.e. 
local) bargaining. However, since enterprise-based bargaining between unions and 
employers is not that common in European countries such as Germany, the union 
bargaining model would not appear to be the most plausible explanation for the wage 
curve in the context of the data for western Germany that we use in this paper.  
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  The third wage curve theory builds on the efficiency wage model of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984). In their model, it is costly for employers to monitor workers’ 
productivity. In this case, employers will offer a premium on the competitive wage 
that will discourage workers from shirking. This premium tends to be higher in large 
enterprises, where monitoring of workers is more costly than in small enterprises (see, 
e.g., Ringuede, 1998).
3 Because the expected penalty for shirking, when detected, is 
greater when it becomes harder to find a job, the threat of unemployment acts as a 
disciplinary device and firms offer a lower wage premium during times of high 
unemployment. A wage curve results. 
  A fourth explanation for the wage curve was put forward by Campbell and 
Orszag (1998) who modified a model of lump-sum labour turnover costs that is based 
on Salop (1979) and Phelps (1984). In this model, firms economize on the costs 
associated with hiring new workers by paying higher wages in order to discourage 
existing workers from quitting at times of a tight labour market. Again, labour 
earnings and unemployment rates would have a negative correlation, ceteris paribus. 
  The above explanations of the wage curve are non-spatial in that they do not 
explicitly consider the existence of interactions between local labour markets. Hence 
local labour markets are interpreted as unconnected ‘islands’ in a national economy. 
However, if the wage curve is due to individual employers facing upward sloping 
labour supply curves, any spatial phenomenon that affects the wage elasticity of the 
labour supply curve will also affect the elasticity of the wage curve. If a region is 
close to other regions with large labour markets, monopsonistic firms may not be able 
to respond to a local negative demand shock by lowering the wage, as the threat of 
unemployment is less when employment opportunities in surrounding regions are 
plentiful. For example, Burgess and Profit (2001) found empirical evidence of spatial 
externalities in the British labour market. In particular, high unemployment levels in 
neighbouring areas tend to raise the number of local vacancies being filled and to 
lower the local outflow from unemployment. 
  Buettner (1999a) estimated wage curves and tested specifications with 
spatially lagged dependent variables, or spatially correlated error terms, by means of 
                                                 
3 There are of course also other reasons why large firms may pay higher wages, for example as a 
consequence of a positive impact of scale on productivity, or to deter quitting of workers with firm-
specific human capital (see, e.g., Coles, 2001, Johansen et al., 2001). 
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labour market data for 327 regions in western Germany.
4  Earlier, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994), Wagner (1994) and Baltagi and Blien (1998) had found evidence of a 
wage curve for Germany using micro data. Nijkamp and Poot (2002) took a sample of 
16 estimates from these studies and found that the average unemployment elasticity of 
pay was about -0.0488, which is rather less than the average elasticity across a much 
larger of sample of studies for a wide range of countries, which is about -0.1. The 
German elasticity is also smaller than a publication-bias corrected estimate calculated 
by Nijkamp and Poot (2002), which is about -0.07.  The lower elasticity for Germany 
is usually explained in terms of the institutional features of the German labour market, 
with relatively centralised wage bargaining. However, Bellman and Blien (2001) 
argue that there is more labour market flexibility in Germany at the local level than 
was previously thought and that, using better data – namely micro data on 
establishments of firms rather than workers – an elasticity of  -0.1 is obtained. 
  Buettner (1999a) tests spatial dependence in the wage curve regression model 
by means of Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistics proposed by Anselin et al. (1996). 
Two types of spatial dependence are usually investigated: first order spatial 
autoregression (SAR) in the error term and a spatially lagged dependent variable 
(SLDV). Buettner finds that the null hypothesis of the absence of a spatial lag is 
rejected, but that there is no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the errors of the 
regression model. Interestingly, including a spatial lag of the dependent variable has 
relatively little impact on the unemployment elasticity of pay. 
The presence of a spatial lag is somewhat cumbersome for the estimation of 
the wage curve, as the OLS estimator in this case is inconsistent. Fairly easily 
implementable maximum likelihood procedures that can be used with spatial lags in 
models for cross-sections, as proposed in Anselin (1988), are not appropriate for 
models with panel data. Techniques for estimation of panel data models with spatial 
error autocorrelation and a spatially lagged dependent variable are still being 
developed (Anselin et al., 2003). Estimation is complicated due to the multiple 
departures from the classical regression model: a choice has to be made between 
spatial lags in the endogenous variable, or spatially correlated error terms (see also 
Baltagi et al., 2001, and Elhorst, 2003). 
                                                 
4 Actually, Buettner (1999a) treated two pairs of contiguous regions in Lower Saxony as composite 
regions and used therefore 325 regions in his regression analysis. 
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  The question also arises as to how to interpret the spatial lag. There could be 
several reasons for the effect of the spatially weighted wage rates of neighbouring 
regions on the local wage rate. On the one hand, the higher wage in surrounding 
regions may increase the opportunity wage of the local worker, thereby raising the 
local wage that a monopsonistic employer needs to offer in order to attract more 
workers. Alternatively, the wage in neighbouring areas may be a proxy for spatial 
spillover effects such as agglomeration advantages, whereby wages and productivity 
are higher in industry clusters that straddle urbanised regions with high population 
densities (e.g., Wheaton and Lewis, 2002). 
  Hence, a more direct approach to test for spatial effect is the use of spatially 
lagged explanatory variables. Specifically, we will consider the spatially lagged 
unemployment rate as a regressor in the earnings function. Buettner (1999a) found 
that inclusion of the spatially lagged unemployment rate lowers the ‘own’ 
unemployment elasticity of pay, although the sum of the local and spatial effect of the 
unemployment rate is greater than the own effect. The latter approach is adopted in 
the next section and merely requires instrumental variable estimation to generate 
consistent estimates. 
  In conclusion, the presence of monopsony in local labour markets suggests a 
range of hypotheses that will be tested in the subsequent sections. Firstly, if 
contiguous labour markets are subject to common shocks, wage equations may exhibit 
spatial residual autocorrelation (SAR).  
Secondly, if local pay is affected by employment conditions in neighbouring 
regions, the spatially lagged wage may be a significant explanatory variable in the 
wage curve (the spatially lagged dependent variable model). Alternatively, the 
spatially lagged unemployment rate may be significant (the spatially lagged 
independent variable model). 
Thirdly, the extent of monopsony in the local labour market may be a function 
of accessibility of this market. Accessibility could affect the local wage level 
positively (employers must offer higher wages in more accessible regions) and lower 
the unemployment elasticity of pay (the unemployment elasticity of pay is greater in 
more isolated regions). We will measure accessibility by means of an index of 
weighted average distance between the region and the other regions and by means of a 
measure of spatial interaction.  
  9
Finally, the implications of remoteness can also be tested by splitting the 
sample of regions into interacting urban agglomerations and relatively isolated rural 
areas. If monopsony is more prevalent in the latter type of regions, the wage curve 
will be more elastic in these rural areas. In addition, we would expect that the effect of 
spatial interaction on wages will be less in a sample of rural regions. 
The above hypotheses are tested by means of our panel of wage and labour 
market variables for the 327 employment regions of the former West Germany 
(excluding West Berlin) over the period 1990 to 1997. Conventional wage curves are 
estimated, and compared with earlier findings, in the next section. Section 4 tests a 
range of spatial effects. 
 
3.  Another look at the wage curve in Germany 
In this section we present estimates of a conventional wage curve using a data set 
provided by the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung), containing data on full time workers employed in 
western Germany. The data, which are only available in aggregated form at the spatial 
level of 327 regions, contain information about average daily wages and the average 
unemployment rate in each region. Information about the number of persons 
employed subdivided by gender, size of firm, industry and level of education is 
available as well.
5 
  Figure 1 shows the spatial variation of the unemployment rate across West 
German regions, in 1997. The spatial pattern suggests the presence of a positive 
correlation of unemployment rates among neighbouring regions. The unemployment 
rate seems to be generally lower in the south than in north. The highest levels of 
unemployment are in those northern regions bordering those belonging to the former 
East Germany. 
 
(Figure 1, Page 29) 
 
  The presence and effect of such spatial patterns in unemployment rates and 
their impact on wage levels will be investigated further in the next section of this 
                                                 
5 More detailed information on the data set can be found in the Annex. 
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paper. We first re-estimate conventional German wage curves with our available 
regional data. 
Using a panel on the average wage in each of the regions, there are two ways 
to control for composition effects. First, an expected regional wage can be computed 
that applies the national wage for each group to the local composition of employment 
across groups. The expected wage is then included as an additional regressor in the 
wage equation. Buettner (1999a) adopted this approach and consistently found that 
this regressor had a coefficient of close to one. The alternative is to control for 
composition effects by inserting composition variables on the right hand side of the 
earnings equation. In the absence of appropriately disaggregated national wage data 
that matched our regional data, this is the only option available with the present data 
and this method has therefore been adopted in the research reported in this paper. Our 
estimation of the wage curve is therefore based on the following specification: 
 
  () ) ( '
2
jt t j jt jt jt jt f d u u y ε δ γ β α + + + + + + = x   (1) 
 
where yjt is the natural logarithm of the average wage in region j at time t, ujt is the 
natural logarithm of the unemployment rate in region j at time t and (ujt)
2 is its square. 
The terms dj and ft are fixed effects over regions and time respectively while εjt is the 
stochastic disturbance term. Finally, the term xjt contains information about regional 
employment characteristics obtained using four different ways of grouping the 
number of employees. 
  Wages of female workers are found to be less responsive to the local 
unemployment rate than wages of male workers in many wage curve estimations 
(Baltagi and Blien, 1998, provide evidence for western Germany). This result is 
usually explained by the higher elasticity of women’s labour supply curve.
6 An 
aggregate analysis neglecting the possible existence of gender-specific wage curves 
would probably underestimate the unemployment elasticity of pay for men in western 
Germany. Unfortunately, the data available for our analysis are too aggregated to 
allow us to estimate wage curves separately for men and women. Instead, the share of 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Killingsworth (1983). The greater supply elasticity of women reduces the potential 
for monopsonistic wage setting by local employers. However, the lower female elasticity is not entirely 
undisputed. Baltagi et al. (2000) and Kennedy and Borland (2000) find that the wage curve elasticity of 
women is greater than that of men, using data on East Germany and Australia respectively.   
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women in region j at time t provides a level effect on wages by gender that is the first 
control variable included in the vector xjt. 
  Secondly, as noted in the previous section, small firms have less monitoring 
costs and offer different employment opportunities than large firms; leading to the 
latter usually paying higher wages (e.g., Ringuede, 1998). The proportion of small 
firms established in a particular region may consequently have an influence on local 
wages. For these reasons the second control variable included in the row vector xjt is 
the share of workers employed in small firms with less than 20 employees in region j 
at time t. 
  Furthermore, since Mincer’s classic contribution on the determinants of 
earnings (Mincer, 1974), it is well known that education is a prime determinant of 
earnings. Given our use of aggregate data we would expect education to exert a 
composition effect: the average wage will be lower in regions with a relatively less 
educated work force. On the basis of these considerations, the third control variable 
we include in the vector xjt is the share of less educated workers in region j and time t. 
  Finally, wages may differ substantially across sectors. Furthermore, we may 
expect rural regions to have on average wages that are lower than in urbanized regions 
due to agglomeration advantages of the latter and the associated productivity gains 
(e.g., Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Since we may identify rural areas as those regions in 
which the percentage of people employed in agriculture is relatively high, the fourth 
control variable we include in the vector xjt is the share of workers employed in 
agriculture in region j and time t. 
Given the above-mentioned data framework and data, we first estimated a 
conventional wage curve using a standard OLS-FE (Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed 
Effect) approach.
7 The results of this estimation are shown in the first two columns of 
Table 1. 
 
(Table 1, Page 24)
 
The estimates in Table 1 allow for a varying elasticity. Comparing columns (1) and 
(2), the logarithm of the unemployment rate performs clearly better than the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 These estimations have been carried out using Stata 7 (updated version). 
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reciprocal of the unemployment rate. The elasticity at the mean unemployment rate of 
7.64 percent is -0.02 based on column (1), and the elasticity is declining at greater 
unemployment rates, as expected. The elasticity is rather smaller than in earlier 
research on western Germany, to which the aggregated nature of the data and the 
limited range of controls undoubtedly contributed. Nonetheless, the wage curve is 
statistically significant and the data do permit identification of spatial effects, as will 
be shown below. 
Given that the data are aggregated to the regional level, the logarithm of the 
unemployment rate is likely to be an endogenous regressor. The Hausman test 
performed on the specification of column (1) in Table 1 gives a value of 14.32, which 
is significant at the 1 percent level. Given the endogeneity of unemployment, we 
conclude that a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is required. For this reason 
we applied a 2SLS estimation approach with fixed effects (2SLS-FE), with the results 
shown in the last two columns of Table 1. The instruments used for the 2SLS 
estimation are the exogenous variables and the logarithm of the unemployment rate 
with a one-year lag. Consequently, seven years of observations were available (1991-
97). 
  Again the unemployment rate in reciprocal form is not statistically significant, 
but the wage curve is present when using the logarithm of the unemployment rate and 
its square as regressors. At the mean unemployment rate, the unemployment elasticity 
of pay is now -0.01, and further declining at higher unemployment rates, as expected. 
The control variables are statistically significant in all specifications and show the 
expected signs, except for the share of less educated workers in some cases. 
  Given the panel nature of the data, a choice must be made between a fixed 
effects or a random effects specification. The test statistic suggested by Keane and 
Runkle (1992) and by Baltagi (2001) to compare the fixed effects model with the first 
difference estimator has a value of 4.5680, which is not significant at conventional 
levels (the test statistic has a chi-square distribution with 11 degrees of freedom). 
Consequently, the usual Hausman test to compare the fixed and random effect 
estimators is the appropriate one. The latter test, with a value of 91.57, rejects the 
random effects model in favour of the fixed effects one.
8 Consequently, the 2SLS-FE 
model of column (3) forms the benchmark for further analysis. 
                                                 
8 These values refer to the log-linear specification of the model given in Table 1, column 3.  
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4.  Testing for spatial effects 
The geographical unit we use in this analysis generally covers a small geographical 
area that in many cases may not exactly coincide with a well-defined local labour 
market area. Consequently, we may expect a high number of commuters between 
neighbouring regions, which may be one cause of regional spatial dependence. In 
order to verify the existence of spatial dependence we computed the Moran’s I 
statistic and a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic on the variables of interest 
(wages and unemployment) as proposed by Anselin (1988, 2001).
9 This requires the 
construction of a spatial weight matrix. Each element of the spatial weight matrix is 
proportional to the inverse of the Euclidean distance between the locations of the 
corresponding regional authorities of contiguous regions. Following Buettner (1999b), 
distances between non-contiguous regions are assumed to be infinite and the 
correspondent elements of the spatial weight matrix are therefore zero. This is not a 
highly restrictive assumption. Analogous to the case of the maximum lag length in 
temporal autocorrelation, some cut-off has to be assumed. The hybrid weight matrix 
here is a good compromise between a Boolean (zero-one) weight matrix based on 
contiguity and a full distance matrix.
10 Finally, the elements of the spatial weight 
matrix were row standardized, that is, the elements of each row add to unity. 
The results are reported in Table 2. While the distribution of Moran’s I 
statistic depends on the assumptions regarding the data generating process, spatial 
autocorrelation is clearly present in our data. This is confirmed by the LM statistic, 
which is asymptotically distributed as χ
2 with one degree of freedom. It can be seen 
from Table 2 that spatial correlation in wages and unemployment rates across the 
employment regions of western Germany exhibits a slightly downward trend during 
the 1990s. Also, the spatial correlation is much stronger for unemployment rates than 
for wages. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 The LM test statistic has a simple functional relationship with Moran’s (1948) I statistic, as noted by 
Anselin (1988, p.191). See also Table 2. Moran’s I was computed by means of Spacestat version 1.91. 
 
10 A full distance matrix is usually not ideal because positive dependence for regions that are close in 
space averages out with negative dependence (e.g. based on some sort of hierarchical pattern) with 
regions further away. Moreover, simulation experiments have shown that the power of tests such as 
Moran’s I is generally higher for relatively sparse weight matrices. We are grateful to Raymond Florax 




(Table 2, Page 25) 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3, reporting the Moran scatterplot of the logarithms of the 
regional average wages and unemployment rate respectively, in 1990 and 1997 further 
corroborate the results of Table 2. The relationship between the log unemployment 
rate and its spatial lag has become weaker from 1990 to 1997, though in both cases it 
is stronger than the relationship between the log wage and its spatial lag. These results 
suggest that regions with high (low) unemployment rates or wages are generally 
located close to other regions with high (low) unemployment rates or wages 
respectively. 
 
(Figures 2 and 3, Page 30) 
 
In what follows we take account of the panel nature of the data and allow for 
contemporaneous spatial correlation, but assume an absence of direct intertemporal 
spatial dependence. That is, we construct an N(T-1)×N(T-1) block diagonal spatial 
weight matrix, in which the sub matrices on the main diagonal are each equal to the 
above-defined N×N row standardized spatial weight matrix.
11 
The LM test statistic for spatial correlation in the error term computed from 
the model of column (3) in Table 1 is 5.8937 (the average over time of the cross-
sectional LM statistics), which is significant at the 5 percent level, but not at the 1 
percent level. The spatial correlation in the error component suggests the presence of 
some relationship between regions that is not accounted for in this model. The 
specification of the wage curve in Table 1 only relates the local wage to the local 
unemployment rate and neglects the geographical location of regions as well as the 
existence of spatial contiguity effects and spillovers between regions. Instead, we 
would expect the relationship between local wages and the local unemployment rate 
to differ depending on employment opportunities in the surrounding areas and on the 
relative cost of commuting or migrating. We can take account of the spatial structure 
in the wage curve estimation in different ways, summarized in the following model: 
                                                 
11 The number of time periods is T-1 because one year is lost by using the lagged natural logarithm of 
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where wji is the element of the j
th row and i
th column of the above mentioned spatial 
weight matrix. The term Σi u itwji is therefore a weighted average of the natural 
logarithm of the unemployment rate in neighbouring regions. This term, which we 
refer to as spatial lag of the unemployment rate, captures the responsiveness of 
regional wages to the unemployment rate of the surrounding regions. The interaction 
between the spatial lag of the explanatory variable and the log of the unemployment 
rate should capture the additional downward pressure on wages that we expect to find 
in regions that have growing unemployment and are surrounded by other regions with 
high unemployment rate. 
The spatial spillover effect term SSEjt reflects the impact of regional 
agglomeration and accessibility on wages. We compute SSEjt in two different ways. 
Firstly, the easiest way to compute the agglomeration index is to add the inverse of 
the distances between a region and its neighbours, weighted by employment in these 
regions. Hence 
 
  ∑ =
i ji it jt w E A  (3) 
 
where Eit represents the number of people employed in region i at time t. 
  A second way to capture regional spillover effects consists of computing a 
measure of spatial interaction based on the number of people employed in each 
contiguous region. We then compute a spatial interaction indicator (Tijt) in the 
following way: 
 
  ( ) ji jt it ijt w E E T
υ τ ψ =   (4) 
 
We will assume τ = υ  = 0.5 which are common choices in gravity models of spatial 
interaction (see, e.g., Sen and Smith, 1995) and ψ = 1 without loss of generality.  
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Finally, we computed the sum over i of Tijt, obtaining the index we used in our 
regression models: 
 
  ji jt
i
it i ijt jt w E E T T
5 . 0 ) ( ∑ ∑ = =   (5) 
 
In both cases, Ajt or Tjt, our hypothesis is that the spatial spillover effect on wages is 
positive. In addition, the interaction between the two measures of SSEjt and the log of 
the unemployment rate is expected to have a positive coefficient, as the 
unemployment elasticity of pay is expected to be less in the more agglomerated and 
less remote regions. 
  The results of the estimation of the various specifications of equation (2) are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
(Table 3, Page 26)
 
In the first two columns of Table 3 we add the SSEjt indicator as defined in equation 
(3) and (5) respectively, and its interaction with the unemployment rate. The two 
models give similar results. In both cases the level effect (Ajt and Tjt) is positive and 
highly significant. This result implies that wages in more agglomerated and accessible 
regions are higher, ceteris paribus. Between the first two models of Table 3, the one in 
which the agglomeration/accessibility index is measured by Tjt gives the better fit.  
As before, the unemployment elasticity of pay can be computed to be negative 
at the mean and the elasticity is again less at higher rates of unemployment. In 
addition, the coefficient of the interaction between the agglomeration/accessibility 
measure and the logarithm of the unemployment rate is significant and positive. The 
wage curve is therefore less elastic in those regions that are located close to highly 
agglomerated or highly accessible areas. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
employers are less likely to lower wages in response to an increase in the local 
unemployment rate if they fear that their workers will quit their current jobs for 
similar ones in a neighbouring region.
12 
                                                 
12 The question naturally arises whether the accessibility variable Ajt and the spatial interaction variable 
Tjt are exogenous regressors. Endogeneity tests suggested that they generally are. For example, the 
endogeneity test of Tjt in the model of Table 3 column (3) yields a value of 5.72, which is not 
significant at the 1 percent level of corresponding F(1, 1950) distribution. In any case, the coefficients  
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  The LM test for spatial correlation of the residuals computed on these two 
models is significant at the 5 percent level, although less so than the value obtained 
for models in which no spatial spillovers are taken into account. To capture residual 
spatial autocorrelation, we add the spatially weighted unemployment rate and its 
interaction with the local unemployment rate to the model of column (2). The results 
are reported in column (3).  
Both the spatially lagged unemployment rate and its interaction with the local 
unemployment rate are statistically significant. It can be easily calculated that, taking 
the interaction effect into account, the elasticity of wages with respect to the 
unemployment rate is -0.001, i.e. negative but very small. It is indeed plausible that 
wages respond less to a change in the spatially lagged unemployment rate than in a 
change in the local unemployment rate. Moreover, the negative response of wages to 
unemployment in surrounding regions is greater when the local unemployment rate is 
higher (the coefficient of the interaction term is negative). This is also consistent with 
the models of monopsonistic local labour markets discussed in Section 2. One 
possible explanation of the negative interaction term is the fact that the chances are 
lower that workers might find alternative jobs in neighbouring regions when 
unemployment in neighbouring regions is higher. This puts downward pressure on 
wages in the local labour market.  
  The LM test for residual spatial autocorrelation on the third model of Table 3 
is not significant at conventional levels. The spatial lag of the unemployment rate is 
therefore a variable which is able to pick up the regional spatial spillovers in our data. 
For this reason it is not necessary to consider additional specifications that include 
lags of the dependent variable or spatial lags in the error term. Although now common 
for cross section data, such spatial models are not yet standard practice and easily 
implemented in case of panel data. Furthermore, in countries such as Germany where 
collective wage agreements play an important role, the economic interpretation of the 
spatial lag of the unemployment rate is more satisfactory than that of a spatial lag of 
wages. 
  In addition to spatial dependence, two other issues that are of interest are those 
of spatial non-stationarity and specific forms of spatial heterogeneity. We consider 
                                                                                                                                            
estimated by instrumenting the spatial variables by their lagged values are only slightly different from 
the ones reported in this paper, and do not imply any change in the results presented here. 
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these two in turn. First, we test for spatial stationarity of all coefficients of interest 
using the procedures for geographically weighted regression (GWR) suggested by 
Fotheringham et al. (1998).
13 The results of such a test, computed for each year 
separately in order to exclude the potential impact of temporal non-stationarity, are 
shown in Table 4.  
 
(Table 4, Page 27)
 
The nonstationarity test is significant for the log unemployment rate and its square 
both in 1991 and in 1997, while the coefficients of the other explanatory variables are 
generally stationary over space.
14 These results support our idea that the wage curve 
relationship is strongly location dependent.  
  The cause of spatial non-stationarity may be a specific form of spatial 
heterogeneity in the data. It is likely that not all local labour markets are equally 
strongly influenced by surrounding labour markets. While highly accessible regions – 
metropolitan areas for example – may show a high level of spillover to the 
surrounding area, less accessible regions – rural areas – may have only weak 
relationships and generate only small spillover effects to contiguous regions. We may 
then expect the relationship between local wages and the local unemployment rate to 
be stronger in rural than in urban areas. 
In order to test whether the relationship between local wages and the local 
unemployment rate is stronger in rural than in urban areas, we adopt the IAB 
classification of regions in more and less urbanised ones. Specifically, we divide our 
regions in three groups: regions with high, weak and no agglomeration. This 
classification is computed on the basis of the density of the population and on the 
basis of the centrality of the location of each region, according to the definition by 
Bellman and Blien (2001). Details can be found in the Annex. The group of regions 
                                                 
13 The estimation was done with the GWR routine of Stata 7. The spatial weighting function was 
Gaussian and all observation were included in the computation of the weighted regressions. Monte 
Carlo simulations (which compare the observed coefficients with the one obtained from randomly 
rearranging the data in space and then repeating the GWR procedure) involved 1000 replications. Since 
consistent estimates were obtained with 2SLS, the GWRs were computed on the second stage 
regression (after predicting the log unemployment rate). 
 
14 With discrete disaggregation of the data into regions with strong agglomeration, weak agglomeration 
and no agglomeration, the coefficients of the spatial interaction term Tjt and its interaction with the  
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with high agglomeration comprises 118 of the 327 regions used in the previous 
analysis, while the group with no agglomeration consists of 90 regions. The remaining 
group (regions with weak agglomeration), which can be considered as a hybrid group, 
comprises the remaining 119 regions.  
In Table 5 we show separate wage curve regressions for the three groups, and 
obtain noticeably different results. In the first three columns of Table 5 we estimate 
the model without any spatial regressors – equivalent to column (2) of Table 3 – while 
in the fourth, fifth and sixth column we estimate the model with the spatial lag of the 
log unemployment rate included. Both kinds of models lead to similar conclusions, 
which is plausible given that, firstly, the LM statistic of spatially correlated errors of 
the first group of models is only slightly significant and, secondly, that the spatial lag 
in the second group of models is itself insignificant. 
 
(Table 5, Page 28)
 
  Table 5 shows that the coefficient of the log unemployment rate is negative 
and significant in regions with no agglomeration, while the interaction between the 
log unemployment rate and the spatial interaction index Tjt is not significant. This 
suggests that there are few wage spillover effects between these regions and 
surrounding regions. 
  In regions with strong agglomeration, however, we find no evidence of a wage 
curve: the coefficient of log unemployment rate is not significantly different from 
zero. However, the spatial interaction effect is now significant at the 1 percent level 
and positive, confirming the importance of spillover effects. These results are 
consistent with the idea that employers in such urban regions face competition of the 
surrounding labour markets and with the presence of agglomeration effects among 
these types of regions. 
  Finally, the results of Table 5 suggest that the statistical significance and 
magnitude of the unemployment elasticity of pay is related to the scale of the 
geographic disaggregation. As Fischer and Nijkamp (1987) argued, a ‘labour market 
area’ is a region within which there is a clear labour market pattern defined by the 
spatial range of employment opportunities open to a worker without changing his 
                                                                                                                                            
local unemployment rate are also significantly different between the three types of regions (see Table  
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place of residence (p. 3). If the spatial unit of observation would be a ‘true’ local 
labour market area defined by a virtual absence of cross-border commuting and cost 
cross-border migration, we would expect a wage curve to be present, whereas in the 
case of more ambiguous local labour market borders the wage curve may be less easy 
to identify. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5). However, such results are not directly comparable with those of GWR.  
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5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we explored the role of spatial effects and of spatial heterogeneity in 
wage curve estimation by means of data on regions of western Germany. The results 
reconfirm the presence of a wage curve, but also confirm that spatial effects matter. 
Taking monopsony as being one of the main causes of the wage curve, we test 
whether the wage curve is more elastic in more isolated regions and the results 
confirm this hypothesis. Clearly, monopsony is explained in our research by the 
potential threat of a move of workers to adjacent areas that will require the worker to 
accept a larger commuting distance, or to migrate. The lower the cost, the more elastic 
local labour supply is expected to be and therefore the lower the opportunity for 
monopsonistic exploitation. This phenomenon would warrant further investigation 
(see also van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2002, on the related issue of endogenous 
commuting costs). 
Wages are also higher in strongly interacting regions. While this is consistent 
with the conclusions of efficiency wage or labour turnover cost models, there may 
also be other causes, such as agglomeration effects. The available data do not permit 
us to identify the role of local monopsony vis a vis other causes of spatial variation in 
the wage curve. 
  In general, we expect that local monopsony is widespread, but that the 
resulting allocative inefficiency is probably only small (see also Boal and Ransom, 
1997). Nonetheless, the phenomenon is particularly of interest in terms of variations 
between firms and workers at the micro level: it allows us to identify those types of 
firms for whom ‘lump sum costs’ such as training and recruitment cost matter and 
workers for whom migration and commuting costs matter. Moreover, the way in 
which such firms and workers are allocated across regions is also of interest and will 
have an impact on the estimation of the wage curve. 
Hence, effects of monopsony may be stronger for some groups of workers 
than for others. Card (1995, p. 793) noted for example that wage curves may be less 
elastic for more senior workers and better educated workers. Differences in the 
migration propensities across groups of workers and differences in their spatial 
dispersion could contribute to the urban-rural wage curve dichotomy identified in this 
paper. The testing of spatial effects in wage curves for specific groups of workers 
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Table 1: Replication of the wage curve for western Germany 
 
Dependent  Variable:  ln  wage  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS-FE  OLS-FE  2SLS-FE  2SLS-FE 
ln unemployment  0.0184* -0.0503***  
 (0.0096) (0.0189)  
(ln unemployment)
2  -0.0095*** 0.0101*  
 (0.0030) (0.0055)  
1/ unemployment rate  0.0068 0.1902 
 (0.0541) (0.1266) 
(1/ unemployment rate)
2  0.0133 -0.2587 
 (0.0872) (0.1908) 
Share of women  -0.7721*** -0.8214*** -1.0583*** -0.9301*** 
 (0.0833) (0.0827) (0.1013) (0.0840) 
Share of small firms  -0.3606*** -0.3967*** -0.2458*** -0.2535*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0630) (0.0627) (0.0672) 
Share of less educated workers  -0.0398 -0.0178 -0.2148** -0.2120** 
 (0.1003) (0.1005) (0.0999) (0.0986) 
Share of employed in agriculture -0.4426 -0.5910** -0.8029*** -0.6159** 
 (0.2969) (0.2963) (0.3091) (0.2985) 
Constant 4.9300*** 4.9420*** 5.2565*** 5.1207*** 
 (0.1054) (0.1047) (0.1087) (0.1037) 
   
Observations 2616 2616 2289 2289 
Nr of regions  327 327 327 327 
   
R
2 within (#)  0.6507 0.6487 0.5961 0.6012 
R
2 between  0.5414 0.5349 0.5356 0.5594 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All models include time dummies 
(#) Pseudo-R
2 for the 2SLS estimations  
  25
Table 2: Spatial autocorrelation in wages and unemployment across regions of 
western Germany 
 
Year  ln wage  ln Unemployment Rate
 Moran's I 
a LM 
b Moran's  I 
a  LM 
b 
1990 0.466 143.49 0.746  367.72 
1991 0.449 133.21 0.720  342.53 
1992 0.442 129.09 0.670  296.61 
1993 0.457 138.00 0.620  253.99 
1994 0.456 137.39 0.601  238.66 
1995 0.454 136.19 0.614  249.10 
1996 0.479 151.60 0.603  240.26 
1997 0.416 114.35 0.560  207.21 
 
a  Moran’s I = 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
µ − µ −




'  with W the row-standardized spatial weight matrix and 
µ is the mean of the spatial vector x. 
b  The Lagrange Multiplier statistics is LM = 
C
NI
2 ) ( with  ) (
2 W W W' + = tr C . This 
statistic is asymptotically distributed as χ




Table 3: Testing for spatial spillovers 
 






ln unemployment rate  -0.0583*** -0.0563***  -0.1752***
 (0.0216) (0.0214)  (0.0651)
(ln unemployment rate)
2 0.0106* 0.0112*  0.0712**
 (0.0058) (0.0058)  (0.0286)
0.0793***   (ln unemployment rate) x Accessibility/Agglomeration 
measure (Ajt) (0.0265)  
0.0598** 0.1208*** (ln unemployment rate) x Accessibility/Agglomeration 
measure (Tjt) (0.0246)  (0.0417)
 -0.0678** (ln unemployment rate) x (Spatial lag of ln 
unemployment rate)   (0.0289)
Accessibility/Agglomeration measure (Ajt)  0.4823***  
 (0.1554)  
Accessibility/Agglomeration measure (Tjt)  0.7104*** 0.7391***
 (0.1711)  (0.1818)
Spatial lag of ln unemployment rate    0.1368**
   (0.0595)
Constant 5.2695*** 5.2340***  5.1546***
 (0.1051) (0.1058)  (0.1110)
   
Observations 2289 2289  2289
Number regions  327 327  327
   
Pseudo R
2 within  0.5975 0.5993  0.5817
   
Spatial LM on ejt 4.9964** 4.7536**  2.3037
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All models include time dummies. Other control variables are the share of women, the share of 
employment in firms with less than 20 employees, the share of less educated workers and the share of 
workers employed in agriculture. To save space the coefficients of the control variables are not 
reported here, but are available from the authors on request. Such coefficients are almost all significant 








Table 4: Significance tests for spatial non-stationarity 
 
Variable  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Constant 0.1491 0.0887 0.3298*** 0.3834** 0.4305*** 0.1221 0.7107***
 (0.114) (0.645) (0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.527) (0.000)
ln unemployment  0.1052** 0.0824 0.3948*** 0.3587** 0.3914*** 0.0938 0.6451***
 (0.017) (0.428) (0.000) (0.032) (0.006) (0.603) (0.000)
(ln unemployment)
2 0.0346** 0.0275 0.1009*** 0.0875** 0.0975*** 0.0203 0.1387***
 (0.012) (0.299) (0.000) (0.025) (0.005) (0.628) (0.000)
0.0424 0.0664 0.0891 0.0595 0.1617 0.0465 0.0348 (ln unemployment rate) x Accessibility/Agglomeration measure (Tjt) 
(0.559) (0.315) (0.237) (0.317) (0.103) (0.610) (0.858)
Accessibility/Agglomeration measure (Tjt) 0.0943 0.1261 0.1340 0.1184 0.3013 0.0954 0.0862
 (0.388) (0.309) (0.517) (0.407) (0.202) (0.713) (0.836)
Share of women  0.0607 0.0724 0.1417 0.0554 0.1505** 0.1007** 0.0525
 (0.484) (0.314) (0.013) (0.307) (0.027) (0.036) (0.405)
Share of small firms  0.0444 0.0454 0.0427 0.0359 0.0289 0.0319 0.0159
 (0.548) (0.494) (0.519) (0.475) (0.972) (0.508) (0.910)
Share of less educated workers  0.1707* 0.1500* 0.0724 0.0810 0.1829 0.0868 0.067
 (0.067) (0.090) (0.501) (0.103) (0.027) (0.123) (0.221)
Share of employed in agriculture  0.2821 0.1278 0.1975 0.2453 1.0179*** 0.3746 0.1998
 (0.622) (0.953) (0.802) (0.429) (0.001) (0.216) (0.651)






























ln unemployment rate  -0.0336 -0.0375 -0.2258*** 0.0005 -0.5013 -0.6488**
 (0.0256) (0.0417) (0.0697) -0.0655 -0.4211 -0.3013
(ln unemployment rate)
2 0.0082 0.0041 0.0590*** -0.0202 0.2215 0.2569**
 (0.0075) (0.0113) (0.0192) -0.033 -0.1894 -0.1289
0.0992*** 0.0553 0.0552 0.0912** 0.2141 0.2927 (ln unemployment rate) x Accessibility/ 
Agglomeration measure (Tjt) (0.0339) (0.0448) (0.0602) -0.0416 -0.1649 -0.1791
0.0388 -0.2183 -0.1978* (ln unemployment rate) x (Spatial lag of ln 
unemployment rate)  -0.0388 -0.1819 -0.115
Accessibility/Agglomeration measure (Tjt) 0.8096*** 0.2223 0.9468* 0.8544*** 0.378 1.4592*
 (0.2323) (0.3435) (0.5110) -0.2407 -0.4498 -0.7554
Spatial lag of ln unemployment rate  -0.0581 0.4615 0.3996*
  -0.0736 -0.3859 -0.2313
Constant 5.1594*** 5.8855*** 5.5905*** 5.1891*** 5.2454*** 4.9034***
 (0.1444) (0.3075) (0.3787) -0.1523 -0.684 -0.5799
 
Observations 826 686 630 826 686 630
Number regions  118 98 90 118 98 90
 
Pseudo R
2 within  0.5867 0.6507 0.5891 0.5823 0.4332 0.3078
 
Spatial LM on ejt 3.7951*  0.7707 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All models include time dummies. Other control variables are the share of women, the share of firms with less than 20 employees, the share of less educated workers and the 
share of workers employed in agriculture. To save space the coefficients of the control variables are not reported here, but are available from the authors on request. Such 





































































































The data set used in this application was provided by the German Institute for Employment Research 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung - IAB), and contains information about wages, 
unemployment rates and employment in western Germany, aggregated at the level of 327 regions 
(Berlin is excluded from the data set). Specifically: 
Wage: the data refer to gross daily wages per (full time) employee, in the period 1987-1997. and have 
been deflated using OECD data on the consumer price index for the whole of Germany, available 
on line at: http://www.oecd.org/EN/statistics/0,,EN-statistics-3-nodirectorate-no-1--3,00.html. 
Trainees and workers with wages lower than12 DM a day are not included in the data set. 
Unemployment rate: persons unemployed and seeking work as a percentage of labour force, 1990-
2000. 
Employment: the data refer to people gainfully employed in 327 regions of western Germany on any 
30
th of June, and covered by the social insurance system. Statistics are based on location of the 
workplace. Low-income workers (see above) and civil servants are not included. The number of 
workers may be broken down by gender, size of the establishment and level of education. On the 
basis of this information we computed the control variables using the different classifications of the 
number of employees in the following way: 
Share of women: percentage of female workers among the total number of employees in each region 
and each year. This variable ranges from 25% to 52%. 
Share of workers employed in firms: workers employed in firms with less than 20 employees, as a 
percentage of the total number of employees of each region and each year. This variable ranges 
from 8% to 51%. 
Share of less educated workers: percentage of workers with only (i) lower secondary school; (ii) 
intermediate (secondary) school without vocational training; and (iii) intermediate (secondary) 
school with vocational training, among the total number of employees in each region and each 
year. This variable ranges from 73% to 97%. 
Share of workers employed in agriculture: percentage of workers employed in firms classified in the 
agricultural sector. This variable ranges from 0.10% to 8.59%. 
Type of region: this information is based on the BfLR/BBR (Bundesforschungsanstalt für 
Raumordnung und Landeskunde / Bundesanstalt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung, Bonn) 
typology. The classification is computed according to the population and to the centrality of the 
location of each region (see Bellman and Blien, 2001). More in detail, the three groups used in this 
paper comprise the following regions: 
  A. Regions with urban agglomeration (118 regions) 
1.  Central cities (39 regions) 
2.  Highly urbanised regions (42 regions) 
3.  Urbanised region (23 regions) 
4.  Rural regions (14 regions) 
  B. Regions with tendencies towards agglomeration (119 regions) 
5.  Central cities (21 regions) 
6.  Highly urbanised regions (61 regions) 
7.  Rural regions (37 regions) 
  C. Regions with rural features (90 regions) 
8.  Urbanised regions (43 regions) 
9.  Rural regions (47 regions) 
Weight matrix: the matrix contains the inverse of the Euclidean distances between location of region 
authorities in contiguous regions, computed from a digitalised map. Distance between non 
contiguous regions is assumed to be infinite, and the correspondent element of the matrix is 
therefore zero (see Buettner, 1999b). 
 